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1 Introduction
Human capital in general, and human capital effects on entrepreneurial team
formation in particular, are among the most widely discussed and analyzed issues in
entrepreneurial research. Research generally agrees that founders’ human capital
endowments affect the success of entrepreneurial firms (Rauch et al. 2005; Cassar
2006). Yet, estimates often show only small impacts (Davidsson and Honig 2003;
Unger et al. 2011).1 Lazear (2004, 2005) points out that entrepreneurs must exhibit
‘‘jack-off-all-trade’’ characteristics; their individual entrepreneurial capability is
limited by their least-developed skill. To derive this hypothesis in market
equilibrium, Lazear assumes that there exist only single entrepreneurs.2
However, a significant proportion of entrepreneurial firms are partnerships
(Aldrich et al. 2002; Ruef et al. 2003). Early research associates larger teams with
the availability of different skills. Schjoed and Kraus (2009) surveys the literature
on team composition effects: the processes linking team composition to firm success
are complex and empirical findings are inconclusive. In contrast, Colombo and
Grilli (2005) confirms the existence of synergies within heterogeneous groups of
founders. In partnerships, partners allocate tasks according to comparative
advantages. Firms in which the partners’ ability profiles provide complementary
matches are more successful.
Concerning the mode of entry, Folta et al. (2010) notes that the possibilities of
entering into entrepreneurial endeavors are ever increasing and nascent entrepre-
neurs can chose from a number of options ranging from fully independent new
ventures to franchises and corporate spin-offs. Cooper and Bruno (1977) originally
coined the term ‘‘incubator’’ to denote spin-off possibilities for high-profile
employees of research-intensive industrial corporations. Bhide´ (2000, p 54) reports
that 71 % of the founders included in the Inc. 500 1989 start-up survey ‘‘replicated
or modified an idea encountered during their previous employment.’’ Recruiting and
matching team members constitutes a key success factor in such new ventures
(Bhide´ 2000). In part, entrepreneurs can overcome deficiencies in human capital
endowments through organizational support.
When relying on an existing organization to sponsor the new venture, some
organizational routines are transferred from the sponsoring organization (Cooper
and Dunkelberg 1986). Recent contributions emphasize that ‘‘external’’ or
‘‘strategic corporate entrepreneurship’’ serves the parent company’s strategic and
organizational renewal; it allows learning about new market opportunities and
1 In part, such estimates hinge on the definition of relevant human capital endowments: specifically,
cognitive abilities, typically proxied by the extent of the individual’s formal education, are not
exclusively decisive for entrepreneurial success. Therefore, studies add measures of business and industry
experience (e.g., Colombo and Grilli 2010) and/or experience as an entrepreneur (e.g., Gruber et al.
2008). Following Unger et al. (2011), evidence from a meta-analysis of 70 independent studies reveals
that human capital outcome variables, such as acquired skills and available knowledge, exhibit stronger
impacts than proxies of human capital endowments.
2 Current empirical evidence is mixed: Wagner (2006) and Backes-Gellner and Moog (2008) confirm
that ‘‘jack-of-all-trades’’-characteristics increase the probability and willingness to become an entrepre-
neur. Silva (2007) reports that, upon controlling for socio-economic and demographic characteristics,
such individuals are not more successful as entrepreneurs.
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business models (Kuratko and Audretsch 2009; Phan et al. 2009). At the same time,
the success of such spin-offs depends on the specificity of the technology transfer
from the parent company (Clarysse et al. 2011). Information regarding potential
partners’ task ability profiles allows rational matching and increases the quality of
the founding team. Thus, some entrepreneurs benefit from organizational support by
parent or sponsoring corporations. However, these benefits do not arise in all new
ventures alike which causes self-selection into corporate-sponsored entrepreneurial
partnerships (Folta et al. 2010).
Consequently, disentangling choices of entrepreneurs and the corresponding
performance implications is difficult due to self-selection and endogenous matching
among the involved parties. Then, adding to the problem of adequately measuring
founders’ human capital endowments, identifying the impacts of such endowments
on entrepreneurial success is further aggravated: the quality of matching individuals
with complementary human capital profiles matters. Failure to account for the
information structure prior to firm foundation risks to mismeasure the relevant, task-
related human capital and misinterpret its impact on firm success. Specifically,
matching takes place under better information regarding individuals’ ability profiles
in incubated spin-offs or new ventures sponsored by existing firms. However, parent
or sponsoring firms’ strategic goals, access to funding, and the type of technology
transfer also directly affects the success of the new venture.
We identify a ‘‘pure’’ incubator effect in founding entrepreneurial firms. The
‘‘pure’’ incubator effect reflects improved matching of individuals with different
ability profiles into development teams. Theoretically, we compare informed and
uninformed individuals’ decisions to enter the market for potential entrepreneurs in
which they can be matched. We show that both the sets of ability profiles among
potential and actual entrepreneurs differ between the two informational scenarios.3
Therefore, empirical research on the effects of team members human capital
endowments on new venture success must account for differences in the information
structure which prevails when potential partners meet.
Using data from the second panel study of entrepreneurial dynamics (PSED II)
on nascent entrepreneurs, we demonstrate that there exists an incubator effect on
firm success which is confined to team foundations and does not apply to single
entrepreneurs. Using measures of formal education, industry experience, and
experience as an entrepreneur, we distinguish three different human capital
endowments. T tests show significant differences in the human capital structure
between spin-offs and sponsored firms and Greenfield ventures. Foundations are
successful, if they generate positive cash-flows and, according to founders’ self-
reports, they are operational. Logit-regressions show that spin-offs and sponsored
partnerships are more successful, while there is no such effect among single
entrepreneurs.
Investigating this effect in more detail, we show that its explanatory power
increases as we statistically level out differences in teams’ average human capital
3 In contrast, the effects analyzed by Fabel (2004) are driven by differences in the objective functions
between entrepreneurial partnerships and industrial firms. Although the production technology is the same
as the one assumed in this paper, there is no effect of the information structure in this study.
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endowments. Hence, in entrepreneurial partnerships, venture success is driven by
enhanced matching of individual human capital endowment profiles rather than
endowment levels. Using coarsened exact matching (CEM), we compute weights
to level out the differences in human capital endowments between spin-offs and
sponsored partnerships and their Greenfield mirror-images. Upon carrying out
this adjustment, the impact of corporate support on venture success further
increases. Summarizing, evidence supports that the ‘‘pure’’ incubator function,
i.e., the superior matching-technology, affects the success of entrepreneurial
partnerships.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: in the next section, formal
analysis investigates the effect of the information structure on the composition and
levels of nascent entrepreneurs’ human capital endowments. Section 3 presents
empirical evidence regarding the impact of the incubator function on entrepreneur-
ial success. The final section discusses and concludes.
2 A formal model of matching nascent entrepreneurs
2.1 The description of the economy
The development process combines two human tasks, indexed t ¼ 1; 2 Each task
must be carried out by one individual. Hence, firms consist of development teams,
each team comprising two individuals.
The two tasks are complementary. Specifically, production reflects an O-Ring
technology4: imperfect performance of either of the two tasks renders the
development process incomplete. An incomplete process generates no revenue.
Denote by a1i; a2ið Þ individual i’s ability profile, where ati 2 0; 1½ ; t ¼ 1; 2, is the
individual’s ability in carrying out task t. We measure task-ability in terms of the
probability of successful task-completion. e.g., consider a team where individual i
performs task 1 and individual j carries out task 2. This team realizes revenue r with
probability ða1ia2jÞ. Revenue equals zero with probability ð1  a1ia2jÞ. The
distribution of ability profiles over the population constitutes public knowledge.
However, ability profiles are non-verifiable. Hence, enforceable contracts cannot be
conditioned on individual task ability.
Individuals differ regarding the costs of searching for appropriate team members.
However, we do not model this search process. Rather, we isolate the effect of the
induced information structure on firm foundations; informed (uninformed) individ-
uals have observed all other individuals’ ability profiles (no other individual’s
ability profile) prior to entering the market for potential entrepreneurs. Thus, we
distinguish two extreme matching scenarios: with random matching, ‘‘nature’’
matches two uninformed individuals in a development team. Rational matching
implies that informed individuals find team members who provide the best match
given their own ability profiles. Said differently, under rational (random) matching,
the individuals’ ability profiles are ex-ante common (private) information.
4 Kremer (1993).
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All individuals can earn the certain wage w in industrial employment. Their
preferences are characterized by the utility function U(y), where y [ 0 denotes
income. The utility function implies risk-aversion, i.e., U0ðyÞ[ 0; U00ðyÞ\0; and
limy!0 U
0 ðyÞ ¼ 1. Every individual possesses identical initial wealth Y [ 0.
Individuals can only commit to enforceable contracts. Hence, the stages of new
firm foundation are as follows:
– at date 0, an individual decides to enter the market for potential entrepreneurs if
her expected utility as entrepreneur is at least as large as her certain utility in
industrial employment. In the rational matching scenario, such potential
entrepreneurs observe every other potential entrepreneur’s ability profile before
making this decision;
– at date 1, potential entrepreneurs are matched into teams of two individuals. In
the random matching scenario, team members observe each other’s ability
profiles. Nash-bargaining determines the governance structure, the capital input,
and the task allocation within the potential new firm;
– at date 2, team members either formally contract to found a new firm or not. If one
of the two individuals decides against actually founding the firm, both individuals
must seek industrial employment. Production begins within the new firms;
– at date 3, ‘‘nature’’ determines project success in the new firms.
To characterize potential and actual entrepreneurs in the two informational
scenarios, we apply the following two-step procedure: we begin with date 1 and
solve the Nash-bargaining problem of any two individuals that happen to be
matched and consider founding an entrepreneurial firm. At date 2, this bargaining
has reached a result but the founding contract has not been formally signed yet.
Hence, either of the two potential entrepreneurs may still decide to rather seek
industrial employment. This assumption serves to define the reservation utilities of
the two individuals in their (date 1) bargaining problem.
In a second step, we analyze the individuals’ decisions to enter the market as
potential entrepreneurs at date 0. Again, the alternative is to immediately seek
industrial employment and earn the certain wage w. In the random matching
scenario, matching risk affects the decision to consider becoming an entrepreneur:
if, upon reaching a bargaining result at date 2, one of the two potential entrepreneurs
decides not to found a new firm, both individuals forgo the alternative wage w for
one period. With rational matching, there is no such risk.5 For simplicity, the
individuals’ discount rate is zero.
2.2 The governance structure of entrepreneurial firms
Suppose two individuals i and j are matched. Let aij ¼ fða1i; a2iÞ; ða1j; a2jÞg denote
the set of their ability profiles. Recall that, at this stage (i.e., at date 1), both
5 A more realistic model would explicitly consider searching for matching team members rather than
only distinguishing two extreme informational scenarios. Then, incubating new firms would imply a
reduction of individual search costs. For instance, successful search would last fewer periods over which
individuals would have to forgo industrial employment. We are confident that conclusions which are
derived from our highly stylized model qualitatively carry over to such more realistic settings.
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informed and uninformed individuals have observed each other’s task abilities.
Generally, if founding a new firm, their expected utilities are given by
EUij ¼ TðaijÞ½a1ia2jUðY  /ðaijÞ þ ð1  bðaijÞÞ½ðKðaijÞÞc  qKðaijÞÞ
þ ð1  a1ia2jÞUðY  /ðaijÞ  ð1  bðaijÞÞqKðeaiÞÞ
þ ð1  TðaijÞÞ½a1ja2iUðY  /ðaijÞ þ ð1  bðaijÞÞ½ðKðaijÞÞc  qKðaijÞÞ
þ ð1  a1ja2iÞUðY  /ðaijÞ  ð1  bðaijÞÞqKðaijÞÞ; ð1Þ
for individual i, and
EUji ¼ TðaijÞ½a1ia2jUðY þ /ðaijÞ þ bðaijÞ½ðKðaijÞÞc  qKðaijÞÞ
þ ð1  a1ia2jÞUðY þ /ðaijÞ  bðaijÞqKðaijÞÞ
þ ð1  TðaijÞÞ½a1ja2iUðY þ /ðaijÞ ½ðKðaijÞÞc  qKðaijÞÞ
þ ð1  a1ja2iÞUðY þ /ðaijÞ  bðaijÞqKðaijÞÞ; ð2Þ
for individual j.
In (1) and (2) TðaijÞ ¼ 1 if individual i (j) carries out task 1 (2) and TðaijÞ ¼ 0 if
individual i (j) carries out task 2 (1). /ðaijÞ denotes a transfer of fixed income
between the two team members. Further, member j (i) receives the partnership share
bðaijÞ 0 ð1  bðaijÞ 0Þ This share determines the individual’s profit claim as
well as her liability for losses. E.g., if bðaijÞ ¼ 0 ðbðaijÞ ¼ 1Þ, professional i
(professional j) becomes a single entrepreneur paying the certain wage /ðaijÞ to her
employee j (employee i). Yet, generally, team members are free to agree on the
governance structure, i.e., a distribution of ownership shares and transfers among
them.
This structure, investments, and the task allocation are simultaneously deter-
mined by (symmetric) Nash-bargaining. Thus, the bargaining outcome solves:
max
KðaijÞ;TðaijÞ;/ðaijÞ;bðaijÞ
½EUij  u12½EUji  u12 ð3Þ
subject to
TðaijÞ 2 f0; 1g; ð4Þ
0 bðaijÞ 1; ð5Þ
KðaijÞ 0; ð6Þ
EUij  u 0 and EUji  u 0; ð7Þ
For parsimony, we assume that individuals do not discount future income. Hence,
u ¼ UðY þ wÞ.
Since, at date 2, formal firm foundations are still voluntary, constraints (7) are
non-binding in this optimization problem. Let superscript ‘‘E’’ indicate bargain-
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ing outcomes: immediately note that, for all KðaijÞ[ 0; /ðaijÞ, and bðaijÞ,
maximizing (3) implies TEðaijÞ ¼ 1ð0Þ if a1ia2j  ð\Þ a1ja2i: Thus, qEðaijÞ ¼
max fa1ia2j; a1ja2ig i.e., the bargained task allocation always reflects comparative
advantages in performing the two tasks.
For notational parsimony again, yijs and y
ij
ns ðyjis and yjinsÞ denote the income levels
in expression (1) (expression (2)) conditional on project success and failure. The
first-order conditions with respect to bðaijÞ; KðaijÞ, and /ðaijÞ yield:
qE aij
 
U0 yijs
 
K aij
  cqK aij   1  qE aij  U0 yijns
 
qK aij
  
EUij  u 12

¼

8
>
<
>
:
9
>
=
>
;
qE aij
 
U0 yjis
 
K aij
  cqK aij   1  qE aij  U0 yijns
 
qK aij
  
EUij  u 12 ifb aij 
¼ 0
2 0; 1ð Þ
¼ 1
8
>
<
>
:
; ð8Þ
½qEðaijÞU 0 ðyijs Þ½cðKðaijÞÞc1  q  ð1  qEðaijÞÞU
0 ðyijnsÞq½EUij  u
1
2ð1  bðaijÞÞ
¼ ½qEðaijÞU 0 ðyjis Þ½cðKðaijÞÞc1  q  ð1  qEðaijÞÞU
0 ðyijnsÞqE½Uji  u
1
2bðaijÞ;
ð9Þ
and
½qEðaijÞU 0 ðyijs Þ þ ð1  qEðaijÞÞU
0 ðyijnsÞ½EUij  u
1
2
¼ ½qEðaijÞU 0 ðyjis Þ þ ð1  qEðaijÞÞU
0 ðyjinsÞ½EUji  u
1
2
ð10Þ
We have to distinguish the following cases:
(i) Suppose that bðaijÞ ¼ 0: In this case, (10) implies
qEðaijÞ þ ð1  qEðaijÞÞ U
0 ðY þ /ÞðaijÞÞ
U 0 ðY  /ðaijÞ  qKðaijÞÞ
¼ ½EU
ji  u12
½EUij  u12
U
0 ðY þ /ðaijÞÞ
U 0 ðY  /ðaijÞ þ ðKðaijÞÞc  qKðaijÞÞ
ð11Þ
The expected surplus qEðaijÞðKðaijÞÞc  qKðaijÞ is positive if KðaijÞ[ 0 (i.e., if
production takes place). Then, (11) contradicts that the LHS of (8) can be greater or
equal than the RHS.
(ii) Similar arguments as in (i) above serve to exclude the case bðaijÞ ¼ 1.
(iii) Consequently, 0\bEðaijÞ\1. Hence, conditions (10) and (8) imply
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qEðaijÞðKðaijÞÞc  qKðaijÞ
ð1  qEðaijÞÞU 0 yij
ns
 
U
0
y
ij
s
 
2
4
3
5
 qEðaijÞ þ
ð1  qEðaijÞÞU 0 yij
ns
 
U 0 yij
s
 
2
4
3
5
¼ qEðaijÞðKðaijÞÞc  qKðaijÞ
ð1  qEðaijÞÞU 0 yij
ns
 
U 0 yij
s
 
2
4
3
5
 qEðaijÞ þ
ð1  qEðaijÞÞU 0 yij
ns
 
U
0
y
ij
s
 
2
4
3
5
ð12Þ
The second terms on each side of (12) are positive. Thus, suppose the first terms
on both sides of the equation are also positive. In this case, (12) implies
U
0 ðyijs Þ
U 0 ðyijnsÞ
¼ U
0 ðyjis Þ
U 0 ðyjinsÞ
 ð13Þ
This implication may be violated if, and only if, both first terms on each side of
(12) are negative. Yet, in that case, (12) and (9) would contradict. Hence, (13) must
be satisfied in the optimum.
Jointly (10) and (8) yield
EUji  u½ 12
EUij  u½ 12
U
0 ðyijs Þ
U
0 ðyjjs Þ
¼ 1: ð14Þ
Then, (14) and (13) imply /EðaijÞ ¼ 0 and bEðaijÞ ¼ 1
2
: The capital input rule
follows from insertion into (9): KE ¼ KEðqEðaijÞ; qÞ is implicitly determined by
qEðaijÞU 0 Y þ 1
2
ðKEÞc  qKE 
 	
cðKEÞc1  q
h i
¼ 1  qEðaijÞ U 0 Y  1
2
qKE
 	
q:
ð15Þ
Hence,
oKE
oqE
¼ U
0
Y þ 1
2
ðKEÞc  qKE½   U 0 Y  1
2
qKE
 
M [ 0; ð16Þ
since D ¼ o2EUEðoKEÞ2 \0. Also,
oEUE
oqE
¼ U Y þ 1
2
ðKEÞc  qKE 
 	
 U Y  1
2
qKE
 	
[ 0 ð17Þ
Summarizing, with risk-averse individuals and financial investments at
risk, the bargained governance structure always constitutes a partnership of
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equals.6 Consequently, the two partners’ investments and expected utilities
are identical. Both are monotonically increasing with team quality qEðaijÞ
which is determined by allocating tasks according to comparative—rather than
absolute—advantages.
2.3 The market for potential entrepreneurs
2.3.1 Market entry under rational matching
Consider four individuals, denoted k, l, m, and n. All four are of the informed type.
Let k and l form one partnership, leaving m and n to found a second firm. Without
loss of generality, assume that qEðaklÞ qEðamnÞ. If, at the same time, ati [ atj for
one t ¼ 1; 2, with i ¼ k; l and j ¼ m; n, either k or l could team up with m or n to
found a partnership which yields higher expected utility for both individuals.
However, this outcome would contradict that such informed individuals maximize
their individual utility. Hence, optimal task allocations within each partnership and
qEðaklÞ qEðamnÞ jointly imply
ðaÞ qEðaklÞ ¼ a1ka2l and qEðamnÞ ¼ a1ma2n ) a1k  a1m ^ a2l  a2n;
ðbÞ qEðaklÞ ¼ a1la2k and qEðamnÞ ¼ a1ma2n ) a1l  a1m ^ a2k  a2n;
ðcÞ qEðaklÞ ¼ a1la2k and qEðamnÞ ¼ a1na2m ) a1l  a1n ^ a2k  a2m;
ðdÞ qEðaklÞ ¼ a1ka2l and qEðamnÞ ¼ a1na2m ) a1k  a1n ^ a2l  a2m
ð18Þ
where at least one inequality must be strict in cases (19) (a, b, c, d).
Hence, rational matching results in a sorting of individuals into partnerships: an
individual with highest ability in task t teams up with an individual who is
characterized by the highest ability in the other task s, where t; s ¼ 1; 2 and t 6¼ s:
Then, individuals with next to top ability in task s founds an entrepreneurial firm
with a partner whose ability in task s is second-ranked as well. Finally, an individual
with the lowest ability in task t teams up with a partner of lowest ability in task s.
Let q denote the minimum team success probability such that two matched
individuals decide to found an entrepreneurial partnership. Thus, with zero discount
rate,
qU Y þ 1
2
ðKEðqÞ cqKEðqÞÞ
 	
þ ð1  qÞU Y  q
2
KEðqÞ
 
¼ UðY þ wÞ ð19Þ
There exists no matching risk in the market for informed entrepreneurs: given the
sorting mechanism and (17) above, individual i can be sure to become an
entrepreneur if, and only if, max ai1; ai2

  ffiffiffiqp ; individuals whose ability profiles
do not satisfy this condition can be sure never to find a partner such that founding a
6 If individuals were risk-neutral, a continuum of governance structures f/ðaijÞ; bðaijÞg could solve the
bargaining problem. Thus, from the introduction, recall that Lazear (2004, 2005) assumes that there exist
only single entrepreneurs who hire an employee to become a team member. Then, this employee receives
a certain wage.
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new firm dominates industrial employment. Consequently, everyone who enters the
market for entrepreneurs actually teams up with a partner to found a new firm.
Figure 1 illustrates market entry decisions and their consequences for team
quality under rational matching: in ða1; a2Þ-plane, small dots represent individual
ability profiles and large dots indicate the task-related ability combinations realized
in entrepreneurial partnerships. All individuals with ability levels greater or equal
than
ffiffiffi
q
p
in at least one of the two tasks enter the market and, eventually, become
entrepreneurs. Due to rational matching, all task-related team ability combinations
are located on the diagonal line connecting
ffiffiffiffi
q;
p ffiffiffi
q
pð Þ and (1,1). Thus, individuals D
and A could both match up with either individual B or C to realize the same team
quality. At the same time, both D and A would not be able to find a partner with
higher a2-level than B and C, and they would not agree to found a partnership with
individuals who exhibit lower ability in task 2.
Average ability within the team, where this average is taken over the two
partners’ abilities in the two different tasks, must be located on one of the lines
(D,C), (A,C), (D,B), or (A,B). Assuming that ability levels correspond to
measurable human capital endowments, empirical studies typically use such
unweighted averages when investigating human capital effects on firm success.
However, (16) and (17) imply that the partnership’s capital investments and project
success are increasing only in the maximum of the two individual task ability levels.
Thus, when informed partners match rationally, partnerships with different
(unweighted) average human capital acquire the same amount of financial capital
and realize the same success probability.
2.3.2 Market entry under random matching
Next, consider the case where ‘‘nature’’ randomly matches uninformed individuals
in the market for entrepreneurs. For every individual i with ability profile ai1; ai2ð Þ,
the quality of the match constitutes a random variable ~qE ið Þ ¼ max ai1a2; ai2a1
 
Fig. 1 Average individual and team-abilities under rational matching
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with a1; a2ð Þ 2 S, where S is the set of ability profiles of potential entrepreneurs. As
usual, we assume that individuals share identical expectations regarding the
distribution of these ability profiles. Further, these expectations are supported by the
actual market entry decisions.
Given these assumptions and (19) above, individual i enters the market for
potential entrepreneurs, if
E~qE ið Þ qE ið ÞU Y þ 1
2
KE qE ið Þ  cqKE qE ið Þ  
 	
þ 1  qEðiÞ U Y  q
2
KE qEðiÞ 
 

 qEðiÞ q
o
þ E~qE ið Þ prob qEðiÞ\q
 
 
U Yð ÞU Y þ wð Þ;
ð20Þ
where qEðiÞ denotes a realization of ~qEðiÞ Without knowledge of the (equilibrium)
joint distribution of ða1; a2Þ, it is impossible to assess the realized average ability
levels across individuals and the expected maximum task abilities in partnerships
that are actually founded.
In Fig. 2, small dots again represent individual ability profiles and large dots
indicate the task-related ability combinations realized in entrepreneurial partner-
ships. The figure depicts the two boundary cases that can occur conditional on the
alternative wage w. If w = 0, every individual who can expect to found a
partnership with positive probability—i.e., probðqEðiÞ[ q [ 0, for at least one
ða1; a2Þ 2 S—will enter the market for entrepreneurs. Given that, at date 0, every
possible ability profile has positive density, market entrants i are characterized by
maxfai1; ai2g q. In this case, ‘‘nature’’ could match up individuals X and Z to
found a partnership. Also, individuals D and C and individuals E and F found
partnerships if they happen to be matched. In contrast, if X is matched with Y, both
potential entrepreneurs agree to rather seek industrial employment.
Fig. 2 Average individual and team-abilities under random matching
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Now, let the alternative wage w. increase. To enter the market for entrepreneurs,
individuals require a higher probability to find a partner such that founding a new firm
is the dominant choice. In the limit, individuals only enter the market, if they can be
sure to be matched up with a partner such that probðqEðiÞ[ qÞ ¼ 1, for all
ða1; a2Þ 2 S. Graphically, in equilibrium, all potential and actual entrepreneurs’
ability profiles must be located on or above the curve that is implicitly defined by
a1a2 ¼ q, connecting points ð1; qÞ and ðq; 1Þ in Fig. 2. E and F would still become
entrepreneurs, while individuals B, D, X, Y, and Z would not even enter the market
for potential entrepreneurs. Note that we investigate a model of entrepreneurial
partnerships rather than single entrepreneurship. Yet, only in this second limiting case
of random matching, Lazear’s (2004, 2005) ‘‘jack-of-all-trades’’-hypothesis actually
applies to partnerships as well: jointly, more balanced ability profiles and higher
average ability increase the probability to find a matching partner and to found a new
firm. Then, further note that the results of single entrepreneur analysis generally do
not carry over to investigating the performance effects of human capital structures in
partnerships: with rational matching, the ‘‘jack-of –all trades,’’ successful single
entrepreneur is replaced by a team of partners balancing the skills of task specialists.
And, this conclusion results from assuming a production technology with comple-
mentary tasks—hence, using the same assumption which enters Lazear (2004, 2005),
only adding the possibility of risk-sharing within partnerships.7
2.4 Empirical implications
The model shows that, with complementary tasks, the impact of the information
structure on the quality of matching nascent entrepreneurs obfuscates the possibility
to empirically test human capital effects: rational matching implies that the sum of
task-specific human capital endowments over all members of a partnership should
be higher compared to randomly matched teams. However, due to the selection into
the pool of potential entrepreneurs, comparisons of non-task-specific aggregates of
entrepreneurial partnerships’ human capital endowments are generally ambiguous.
Therefore, regression analysis using stocks of team members’ joint endowments as
explanatory variables does not allow inferring the impacts of these different types of
human capital on firm success. Specifically, given that partnership incentives induce
task allocation according to comparative advantages, it is impossible to predict the
impact of average or total team human assets on venture performance without
identifying the information structure at the time of firm foundation.
Direct empirical tests would therefore require identification of the individual
partners’ task-assignments and the task-specific optimal human capital mix. To our
knowledge, such data on entrepreneurial partnerships does not exist. Thus, we
proceed by analyzing a data set which has been widely explored by other
researchers before. Its characteristic features are well-documented in the existing
literature. We distinguish incubated spin-offs and start-ups that are sponsored by
existing firms from Greenfield projects. To organize the partnership, the former can
7 To our knowledge, we are first to show that, albeit only in this boundary case, ‘‘jack-of-all-trade’’
properties characterize entrepreneurial partners as well.
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draw on the relevant pool of current colleagues. Using existing business contacts,
potential partners may also be found in the supporting firms’ suppliers, customers,
or competitors. Thus, this variable marks differences in the information structure
regarding potential partners’ ability profiles prior to entering the pool of nascent
entrepreneurs. We concentrate on only two hypotheses:
1. there exists a ‘‘pure’’ incubator effect which only applies to entrepreneurial
partnerships;
2. success of entrepreneurial partnerships is enhanced by incubating to match
partners.
To test hypothesis (1), we compare single entrepreneurs with partnerships while
controlling for a large set of individual, project-specific, and environment-specific
variables. Focusing on hypothesis (2), we need to show that this ‘‘pure’’ incubator
effect applies to matching individuals with different human capital endowments.
Thus, we (statistically) level out differences in the teams’ average human capital
endowments. To support our second hypothesis, the absorbent power of the
incubator-variable indicating differences in the information structure must increase.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 The data
We draw on the second panel study of entrepreneurial dynamics (PSED II). PSED II
is a representative survey of entrepreneurial activities in the United States that
portrays individuals during their business creation process. The dataset describes the
characteristics of nascent entrepreneurs, documents the sequences of the organizing
activities, summarizes the types and quantities of resources committed, and
characterizes the new ventures.8 The term nascent entrepreneur refers to individuals
who intend to start a new firm, have already carried out some activity to help start
the business, expect to own part of the firm, and do not yet own an operational
business. Nascent entrepreneurs are involved in an ongoing but not yet operational
start-up. However, such individuals may possess entrepreneurial experience from
the foundation of previous ventures. Hence, the term ‘‘nascent’’ exclusively reflects
the current and ongoing effort to create a new firm. In the empirical part, we
distinguish between different variants of pre-start-up experience in the empirical
part in which we provide respective definitions.
PSED II identifies individuals in late 2005 and early 2006, with four recurrent
follow-up interviews in 12 months intervals. The last wave E collects data in
January 2010. The survey initially addressed 31,845 individuals. Out of this
probability sample, 1,214 active nascent entrepreneurs are identified on grounds of
screening questions. These questions establish whether they intend to start-up a new
firm, carried out at least one start-up activity in past years, expect to own part of the
8 Detailed descriptions of the sampling method used to generate PSED II and an overview on the data
structure can be found in Reynolds and Curtin (2009).
When teams of employees spin-off partnerships 395
123
firm, and do not already own an operational business. Hence, the sample’s
entrepreneurs are involved in an ongoing but not yet operational start-up. This early
stage screening ensures that the data is representative, and, more importantly,
reduces distortions due to survivorship biases. Throughout the data collection
process, respondents provide affirmative answers concerning a package of start-up
activities. The longitudinal structure derived from re-interviewing over the course of
5 years, with monthly indications of activities which are started and finished, allows
for inferences regarding the process of organizing activities and, generally,
facilitates causal inferences among dependent and independent variables.
Due to non-response and venture disbandment, only 972 of the 1,214 nascent
entrepreneurs of Wave A are still included in Wave B. This number decreases to
746, 526, and 435 in Waves C to E. 460 of the original start-ups disbanded their
venture, while 228 perceived their venture as operational; 247 reported still ongoing
organizing activities in Wave E, but did not perceive their venture as operational.
Lastly, 279 start-ups out of the initial sample do not report in at least one wave. We
omit these observations.9 For comparison purposes, there are 381 single entrepre-
neurs among those 688 who either disband or report to be operating. However, our
analysis concentrates on the remaining 307 firms which are organized as
partnerships.
3.2 Definitions of variables
3.2.1 Dependent variable: completion of entrepreneurial organizing activities
Our success measure avoids problems associated with the use of researcher-defined
or self-reported outcome measures. We define foundations as successful if they
generate positive cash-flow and, according to founders’ self-reports, they are
operational. Specifically, our measure combines questions A35 and A41 of PSED
II—i.e., whether monthly revenues ever exceeded monthly expenses for a period of
6 month (including salaries for the managers), and whether, based on this
achievement, the respondents would characterize their venture as being operational.
Only if both conditions are satisfied, the dependent variable attains the value of one.
We label this outcome ‘‘perceived venture emergence.’’
We compare these firms with those which indicate to have abandoned their
venture. Davidsson and Gordon (2011) report the existence of ‘‘dilettante dreamers’’
or hobbyists in nascent entrepreneurial sample. To rule out such cases and to make
the nascent phase comparable across start-ups, the study suggests comparing start-
ups excluding this ‘‘still trying’’ category (see also Parker and Belghitar 2006).
Accordingly, we prune all observations that document a ‘‘still-trying’’ status in
Wave E. Following Delmar and Shane (2003), we check whether all members of
9 We tested for sample selection and attrition biases using our explanatory variables and whether or not
respondents omit filing responses. Among the variables, only age and education influence the subsequent
filing of responses positively (at the 1 and 5 % level, respectively). Hence, the sample resembles a slightly
more educated and older population of nascent entrepreneurs than the initial sample of entrepreneurs.
However, none of the other main explanatory variables is related to the subsequent filing of responses
across the waves.
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partnership report disengagement. If some members remain active, we do not treat
the venture as disbanded. Rather, due to its ‘‘still trying’’ nature, we omit the
observation as well.
3.2.2 Explanatory variables
The following are variables of key interest:
Formal education: Respondents were asked to indicate the highest level of
education for each members of the entrepreneurial team. We recode this variable,
ranging from elementary school to PhD, into number of years of education (see e.g.,
Davidsson and Honig 2003; Iacus et al. 2011). Thus, a high school degree implies
12 years of education, a college degree is taken to require 16 years of education,
and a PhD yields 20 years of education.
Industry experience PSED II provides information regarding years of work
experience in the new venture’s industry, years of full-time paid work experience,
and years of managerial, supervisory, or administrative responsibilities of the
nascent entrepreneurs. Combining the factors, the value of Cronbach’s alpha is 0.72.
Entrepreneurial experience: entrepreneurial experience includes all ventures
which an individual has founded or helped to found. Generally, such experience is
valuable regardless of the ventures’ success (Kaiser and Malchow-Moeller 2011).
We use information on the number of other businesses which our subjects
previously helped to start as an owner and the number of other businesses which
they have owned. The correlation among these two variables is 0.6; the value of
Cronbach’s alpha is 0.65 when combining these factors.
All of these human capital endowment variables are calculated as averages across
all team members. Then, our key informational variable is defined as:
Incubated: responses to question AA10 in the PSED 2 data set allow identifying
entrepreneurs who either pursue a spin-off and purchase their firm, or are sponsored
by an existing organization. The variable takes on the value one in case of such
corporate affiliations and equals to zero otherwise.
3.2.3 Control variables
Social contexts in which entrepreneurs organize their in which new ventures and
their individual characteristics may differ widely. Such features may influence the
number of activities which a nascent entrepreneur is able to pursue as well as
whether the partnership could benefit from incubating. Thus, we include a number
of control variables:
Age: we control for the average age of team members as reported in Wave A.
Team size: this variable adds up all members of the partnership as of Wave A.
Motivation: we follow Dimov (2010) and include questions from PSED II on
entrepreneurial motivation into our empirical analysis. The reflective measure of
start-up motivation comprises the answer to the question of whether the respondent
agrees with the statements: ‘‘There is no limit as to how long I would give
maximum effort to establish my business’’ and ‘‘My personal philosophy is to do
whatever it takes to establish my own business.’’ We include the average of these
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two scores into the empirical analysis. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.71, comparable to
Dimov (2010).10
Self-efficacy: We measure self-efficacy using the five questions identified in Dimov
(2010). The questions employ a five-point Likert-type scale. The Cronbach’s alpha is
0.68 (corresponding to questions AY4 to AY8 from PSED 2). The original PSED 2
scale is inverted so that higher values indicate higher levels of self-efficacy.11
A growing body of research in entrepreneurship suggests that the nature of the
opportunity which is pursued influences organizational actions (Shane 2003;
Dencker et al. 2009). And, more importantly, entrepreneurs are aware of such
differences when selecting which opportunity to pursue. We attempt to control for
such effects by including the following variables:
Industry: we include dummy variables that identify the following industries:
retail, consumer services, health, consulting, manufacturing and construction, real
estate and finance, and other industries. Identifying the reference group, we omit
this last dummy in each regression to avoid perfect collinearity.
Market newness: respondents were asked to assign the number ‘‘3’’ if ‘‘all
customers will be unfamiliar with this new product or service’’, ‘‘2’’ if ‘‘some
customers will be unfamiliar with this new product or service’’, and ‘‘1’’ if ‘‘none of
the customers will be unfamiliar with this new product or service’’. Dahlqvist and
Wiklund (2011) include this variable when constructing an index to represent the
newness of a product or service to customers.12
Competition: we measure the entrepreneur’s perception of competition using a
three-point scale: ‘‘3’’ is associated with the response ‘‘there are many other
businesses offering the same product or service,’’ ‘‘2’’ captures the perception that
‘‘there are few other businesses offering the same product or service,’’ and the
response ‘‘there are no other businesses offering the same product or service’’ yields
value ‘‘1.’’
3.3 Incubator effect on partnership success
Table 1 summarizes the details for the underlying sample of this study including
435 nascent ventures that are founded by teams of entrepreneurs. 35 % of these
ventures report their status as ‘‘operational/emerged.’’ In some 65 % of cases the
ventures have been disbanded by all founders. Approximately 25 % of the
entrepreneurial teams report a ‘‘still-trying’’ status as per wave E. These
10 We acknowledge that the reliability of this measure is somewhat weak. Yet, one question from
Dimov’s (2010) measure was not included in the resampling of PSED 2. We also estimate the model
without this measure; the results do not change noticeably. Moreover, responses are only available for the
respondent and not for all team members.
11 Townsend et al. (2010) includes only a subset of three questions AY6 to AY8 in their analysis.
However, to make our results comparable to previously published studies, we e follow Dimov (2010). We
also estimate a variant using only the questions identified in Townsend et al. (2010); again, the results do
not change noticeably.
12 We regress this measure on the probability of engaging in the development of a proprietary technology
or process, or whether entrepreneurs apply for a patent or get a patent granted. All coefficients are positive
and highly significant at 0.1 % level. Hence, we are confident that this measures proxies of market
newness of the firms’ products.
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observations are omitted from our data set and not tabulated. Performances within
PSED II are similar to those reported by other studies analyzing new firm creation in
the US (Spletzer et al. 2004; Reynolds 2009). Table 1 presents the summary
statistics and correlation matrix. On average, nascent entrepreneurs in the sample
have an education level equivalent to some 15 years of formal education (with a
standard deviation of around 2 years), 13 years of industry experience, and almost
half of the entrepreneurs have been involved (either assisting or owning) in a
previous start-up. Incubated entrepreneurial teams represent roughly 15 % of the
sample.
The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable implies using logit regressions
on ‘‘perceived venture emergence’’ vs. the reference category ‘‘venture disband-
ment.’’ All regression results are collected in Table 2.
Regressions (1) and (3) in Table 2 provide the baseline models for single
entrepreneurs and partnerships. Among the human capital variables, only Industry
Experience shows a significant positive impact on venture success in both groups of
firms. Most notably, incubating exhibits a positive and significant impact only for
partnerships. There is no such effect in the group of single entrepreneurs. This
difference indicates that, within our sample, the parent company’s strategic interests
and/or the specificity of the technology transfer does not affect venture success;
otherwise, the effect should arise for both single entrepreneurs and team
foundations. PSED II is known to contain relatively few high-tech ventures. Hence,
this finding does not necessarily conflict with previous studies which report such
effects. However, for exactly this reason, the data set is particularly well-suited to
serve our analytic goals: incubating the venture appears to be exclusively related to
the induced quality of a partnership. Also, note that self-efficacy shows a positive
significant effect only for single entrepreneurs. It is tempting to interpret this
difference to imply that the single entrepreneur’s self-perceived organizational
effectiveness substitutes for the possibility of task-division in partnerships. As
should be expected, Age reduces the success probability for both groups of ventures.
Table 3 reports simple t tests to show that, except for formal education, the
entrepreneurs’ human capital endowments are higher in incubated partnerships.
Also, there is a significantly higher share of incubated ventures which perceive their
venture as successfully emerged over the observation period. Hence, we cannot be
certain that the effect of incubating in regression (3) is actually due to different
human capital structures within such partnerships compared to Greenfield ventures.
At this stage, we would still need to concede that the performance differences could
reflect differences in aggregate endowment levels.
Simply regressing a dummy variable capturing the incubation decision on the
outcome of the process is only valid if the incubating firms make mistakes (i.e.
strategies are random), or if all factors driving the outcome are observable (Shaver
1998). Both conditions are unlikely to be satisfied for our non-experimental data.
Hence, inferring the counterfactual from the control groups that are contained in the
data could lead to erroneous results due to selection effects. Accordingly, we control
for the imbalance across the incubation and non-incubation group to infer whether
selection and additional value-added effects are associated with the incubating
organization. To ensure that we can infer the counterfactual from the control group,
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we employ CEM (Iacus et al. 2011; Singh and Agrawal 2011). In contrast to other
matching methods, CEM reduces the covariate imbalance between the treatment
group, the incubated foundations, and the control group of Greenfield projects
without the need to re-examine the balance and, likely, to re-estimate the model
(Iacus et al. 2011; Ho et al. 2007): based on Scott (1992) data is temporarily
coarsened into groups and matched exactly in the coarsened data bins. Subse-
quently, the actual (‘‘uncoarsened’’) data on the matched observations is used in the
empirical analysis of causal effects. The ex-ante specification ensures common
support; all matched observations within bins are, by definition, in the area of
common support. Thus, there is no need to test this feature ex-post. Moreover, since
the balance is not achieved using an empirical model, e.g. by linear regression or
maximum likelihood estimator, CEM reduces model dependence (Imbens 2004).
Matching helps controlling for some (or all) confounding pre-treatment
covariates. It makes the empirical estimation less model-dependent, prunes
observations that have no close match within both the control and the treatment
group, and removes heterogeneity with respect to human capital endowments.
Hence, it ensures a better balance between the treatment and control group. As a
consequence, the covariates in both groups are more similar. Thus, inferences are
possible despite the potential pre-treatment endogeneity caused by matching
through the incubating organization. By comparing the effects across the different
sets of models, we can also infer performance variations caused by selection
through rational matching.
Regression models (4) to (6) in Table 3 apply CEM-weighting to reduce the
imbalance only for one the human capital endowment variables, namely formal
education (in model (4)), industry experience (in model (5)), and entrepreneurial
experience (in model (6)). Recalling Table 3, industry and entrepreneurial
experience showed significant differences between incubated and Greenfield
partnerships. Hence, model (7) applies CEM-weighting to both of these variables.
Then, regression (8) is carried out with CEM-weighting for all three human capital
endowment variables. For completeness and comparison, we also report a CEM-
weighted regression for the group of single entrepreneurs as model (2). Results
confirm that there is no particular benefit of incubating such ventures.
In strong contrast to this result for ventures led by single entrepreneurs,
incubating ventures retains its highly significant positive effect on venture success.
Table 3 T tests for differences in mean values of non-incubated vs. incubated ventures
Variable/type of sample Non-incubated vs. incubated entrepreneurs
Formal education -0.377 (-1.20)
Industry experience -2.150? (-1.82)
Entrepreneurial experience -0.316* (-2.34)
Perception of emergence -0.253** (-3.16)
Values indicate differences in mean values for the corresponding variables and are calculated as the
difference between non-incubated and incubated entrepreneurial teams. T-statistics for a two-tailed test
for differences in mean values are shown in parentheses
? p \ 0.1, * p \ 0.05, ** p \ 0.01, *** p \ 0.001
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To rule out that these effects constitute artifacts associated with the particular
matching method, Table 4 reports differences in mean values of the core variables
used in models 5–9 of Table 2: there are no significant differences in formal
education, industry experience, and entrepreneurial experience between single
entrepreneurs and team entrepreneurs upon matching contingent on these core
variables. Hence, the effect derived for the incubation variable is robustly related to
the probability to perceive the venture as emerged. Matching on more variables
implies that more observations are pruned since incubated partnerships do not find a
matching Greenfield project. Thus, the number of observations decreases. This
effect is most notable when comparing model (8) which only uses 96 observations
with models (4) (5) (6) which are based on more than 280 observations each and
model (7) which still rests on 255 observations.13 This feature warrants some
caution when comparing coefficients. Yet, we are confident that our results uncover
an increasingly strong effect of incubating partnerships as CEM-weighting levels
out more inequalities in the teams’ human capital endowments; the absorbent power
of the variable identifying incubated partnerships increases. Since this effect is net
of the selection into either of the two groups of partnerships, it lends support for the
existence of additional value-added effects which are ‘‘purely’’ associated with
incubating.
At the same time, team size remains insignificant throughout the different
models. Hence, total human assets of the partnerships appear irrelevant. Lastly, in
all but model (8) which applies CEM-weighting to all three human capital variables,
Table 4 T-tests sample means between single entrepreneurs and team ventures
Variable/type of
sample
Model 4: solo
vs. team
Model 5: solo
vs. team
Model 6: solo
vs. team
Model 7: solo
vs. team
Model 8: solo
vs. team
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Formal education -0.0147
(-0.11)
-0.0445
(-0.32)
-0.0457
(-0.33)
-0.172
(-1.12)
-0.129
(-0.83)
Industry
experience
0.873
-1.64
1.033*
-1.97
0.836
-1.61
0.905?
-1.83
-0.224
(-0.31)
Entrepreneurial
experience
-0.00865
(-0.12)
-0.0854?
(-1.67)
-0.021
(-0.30)
-0.105*
(-2.50)
-0.106*
(-2.19)
Perception of
emergence
-0.0369
(-0.99)
-0.0434
(-1.20)
-0.0445
(-1.23)
-0.0567
(-1.45)
-0.0762
(-1.32)
Values indicate differences in mean values for solo vs. team venture after CEM matching. T-statistics for
a two-tailed test for differences in mean values are shown in parentheses
? p \ 0.1, * p \ 0.05, ** p \ 0.01, *** p \ 0.001
13 With respect to comparing statistically significant and non-significant coefficients, we follow the
extant literature on comparing coefficients within logit and probit models. Hoetker (2007) p 338, for
example, notes that ‘‘If the model is estimated separately for each group, the researcher can—at a
minimum—compare the statistical significance of the coefficients across groups. This is possible because
the coefficients and standard errors are consistent within each group. One could report, for example, that x
has a significant and positive impact for Group 1, but is not significant for Group 2.’’
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Industry Experience retains a distinctly separate positive effect on partnership
performance. As noted above, model (8) can only rely on 96 observations. Thus, we
cannot rule out that this effect may exist robustly. Recall that Industry Experience
actually comprises years of work experience in the industry and in managerial
positions which reflect opportunities for on-the-job learning or training. Possibly,
then, learning on-the-job can actually substitute rather than complement lacks of
formal education and entrepreneurial experience.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Our formal model assumes that entrepreneurial partnerships combine complemen-
tary human tasks. Since partners will allocate tasks according to comparative
advantages, the effect of founders’ human capital on firm success hinges on the
information structure that prevails when nascent entrepreneurs are matched in
partnerships. Empirically, we assume that rational matching occurs in incubated
spin-offs and corporate-sponsored ventures. Comparisons with single entrepreneurs
show that the incubator effect is confined to partnerships. Then, among partnerships,
the human capital structure significantly differs between incubated ventures and
Greenfield projects. Using CEM, we compute weights to level out these differences
in human capital endowments. The impact of corporate support in founding the new
firm is positive and increases as CEM-weights are applied to more of our human
capital variables.
Data limitations preclude direct tests of our model of task complementarities.
Although PSED II contains a variety of human capital measures on individual level
and information regarding tasks which need to be completed for venture emergence,
it does not allow identifying the allocation of these tasks among partners. Thus, our
empirical analysis cannot uncover optimal task-specific human capital mixes.
However, our results should raise interest in pursuing this issue further: we are
confident to have identified a ‘‘pure’’ incubator effect. This effect is neither due to
selecting individuals with higher levels of human capital into spin-off partnerships,
nor—as demonstrated by comparisons with single entrepreneurs—reflects technol-
ogy transfers or strategic interests of parent companies. The available theory
alternative suggests that incubating improves the information structure when
matching individuals with complementary task-abilities.
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